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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
15339

vs.
DE VERE COOLEY,

Defendant-Respondent.

SUPPLEMENT TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SIXTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, JUDGE, PRESIDING
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

DAVID L. MOWER
Garfield County Attorney
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Attorneys for Appellant
PATRICK H. FENTON

13 \Vest Hoover Avenue
Cedar city, Utah 84720
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CONES NOW the Appellant and supplements its brief previously
filed herein as follows, to-wit:

A R G U ME N T
POINT NO. III:

INAPPLICABILITY OF "SINGLE CRIMINAL

EPISODE" STATUTE
Appellant expresses awareness of this Court's recent
opinion in the case State of Utah vs. Edward Lane Cornish,
filed September 1, 1977, and also its recent opinion in the
case State of Utah vs. Steven A. Ireland, filed October 4, 1977.
Absent a stipulation by counsel, these decisions would dictate
the conclusion that the offenses in question were not part of
a "single criminal episode" since neither the requirement of
closeness in time nor the requirement of sole criminal objective
have been met.

POINT NO. IV:

THE STATUTORY PROSCRIPTION AGAINST

"SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTIONS" HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE
CASE AT BAR.
The statute in question, 76-1-403, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
talks in terms of a "subsequent prosecution" and in terms of a
"former prosecution."

After the former prosecution has termi-

nated as per the statutory guidelines, then there cannot be a
subsequent prosecution.

The provisions prevent what in some

iurisdictj,,11·c, is a common practice of "wearing a defendant
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down" by filing a new charge after the jury has returned a
verdict of acquittal.
The controlling factor in determining the applicability of
the statute under discussion rests on what is meant by a
"subsequent prosecution."
section 76-1-302(2) provides that:

"A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and
filing of an indictment by a grand jury or upon
the filing of a complaint or information."
(Emphasis added)
In the subject case the Defendant was charged by the
arresting officer with three separate offenses.

All were

commenced simultaneously and, of primary significance, all
were active prosecutions before a disposition as to any one
was reached.

It would seem, therefore, that any discussion

about "former prosecution" or "subsequent prosecution" is
rendered inapplicable as to these three offenses.

The Defendant,

as was his right, appeared and plead guilty on two of the
offenses and not guilty on

the third offense.

The State, as

was its right, sought then to continue prosecution on the third
offense.
If the Court were to adopt a position contrary to the one
advanced herein, the net result would be to allow a defendant
to choose among the offenses charged, race to the justice of
the peace, plead guilty to the favored one, and thereby sumffiilrily conclude the entire matter against him.
r~sult

Such an absurd

is nul con temp lated by the statutes nor would it foster
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onY useful or suGstantive purpose or right to which either the
defendant o.r the s til te is entitled.
The suggested construction leaves fully intact the
protection which the statutes seem designed to afford a defendant
who comrni ts more than one criminal offense in a single criminal
episode.

In such cases the defendant knows he cannot be sub-

jected to separate trials for multiple offenses [Section 76-1-402(2))
and, with certain limited exceptions, a defendant knows that when
he goes to trial the charges against him are fixed and there
cannot be a "subsequent prosecution."

[Section 76-1-403(1))

The thrust of the statutes when read together and given
fair construction requires the prosecution to file all offenses
within its knowledge growing out of a single criminal episode
prior to the trial on any of such offenses and assures the
defendant that he can neither be subjected to a "multiplicity
of suits" nor to a "subsequent prosecution" after the filed
charges have been disposed of.

As such the statutes are con-

sistent with fair play and serve salutary objectives, benefiting
not only the defendant but the Court in its effort to handle
criminal matters in an orderly, expeditious manner.

To the

contrary, the position advanced by the respondent would serve
no useful purpose, would tend to make a game out of the administration of justice, and would tend to require a defendant to
plead guilty on all charges or not guilty on all

charges.

Such would disrupt the defendant's right to acknowledge his guilt
~," tu so1nc LJU t

not al 1.

While the concept is rarely given voice,
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thP right to plead guilty is equally as important as the right
to plead not gui 1 ty ·

_

COt::'LC

The State is without entitlement to

e or unduly limit either right.

S U MMA R Y
Absent the stipulation of counsel the case would be
disposed of under the principles announced in the Cornish
and Ireland decisions.

Beyond the concern of those cases

is the threshold question of whether or not there is a
"subsequent prosecution."

If the answer to that question

is in the negative, as it must be here, then the point
previously raised by appellant concerning the jurisdiction
of a single court need not be reached.

All prosecutions

herein had been commenced and all were active before any
were disposed of, hence any inquiry re exceptions to the
"subsequent prosecution" proscription would be moot.
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